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Ludovic Soutif (*)
In what sense is Frege’s (Statement of the) Puzzle 
“problematic”?1
Resumen: En este artículo me ocupo de la 
explicación de Glezakos (2009) de por qué el 
puzzle de Frege no es problemático. Desde el 
punto de vista de Glezakos, la formulación de 
Frege del puzzle –¿cómo pueden oraciones de la 
forma a=a y a=b, si son verdaderas, diferir en 
valor cognitivo, si expresan el mismo contenido 
semántico y son verdaderas por la autoidentidad 
del mismo objeto?- no debería considerarse 
problemática, puesto que el puzzle implica 
circularidad, o porque, planteado neutralmente, 
ni siquiera puede ser formulado. En contra de 
esto argumento que si, como ella lo considera, 
la formulación de Frege es “problemática”, no 
lo es por la razones que Glezakos proporciona, 
sino porque se basa en un par de suposiciones 
cuestionables: las suposiciones de que i) no hay 
ambigüedad en cuanto a qué aspecto del signo 
(en su relación con el referente) es relevante 
para una formulación neutra del puzzle; y ii) las 
formas mismas de la (oración) son aquello de lo 
que cual uno puede aseverar, razonablemente, 
que difiere en valor cognitivo.
Palabras claves: Puzzle de Frege. Valor 
cognitivo. Individuación del nombre. Formas de 
la oración. Tipo. Ejemplar.
Abstract: In this paper I take issue with 
Glezakos’s (2009) account of why Frege’s puzzle 
is un-puzzling. On her view, Frege’s statement of 
the puzzle –how can sentences of the form a=a 
and a=b, if true, differ in cognitive value if they 
express the same semantic content/are made 
true by the same object’s self-identity?– should 
not be considered any puzzling either because 
it is on the whole circular, or because, neutrally 
stated, it cannot even be set up. I argue against 
this that if, as she takes it, Frege’s statement 
is “problematic” it is not for the reasons she 
gives, but because it rests upon a couple of 
questionable assumptions; the assumptions that 
i) there is no ambiguity as to which aspect of the 
sign (in its relation to the referent) is relevant to 
a neutral statement of the puzzle ii) it is of the 
(sentence) forms themselves one may sensibly say 
they differ in cognitive value.
Key words: Frege’s puzzle. Cognitive value. 
Name individuation. Sentence forms. Type. 
Token.
A trend in recent literature on Frege’s puzzle 
has been to favour a problem-dissolving approach.2 
By this, I mean a type of approach the aim of 
which is to free (philosophical) semanticists and 
epistemologists from the apparent need to meet 
the challenge(s) raised by it.
The challenge is this: how to explain that 
two true identity sentences of the form a=a 
and a=b differ in cognitive value if they do 
not differ as to what they say/that which makes 
them true? There are many ways to show that 
the challenge need not be met and, accordingly, 
that Frege’s puzzle is un-puzzling. One is to 
show that an element in it, the so-called “minor 
premise”, is question-begging. The difference in 
cognitive value (informativeness) of the identity 
sentences is, indeed, puzzling, in the face of 
the (alleged) identity of their semantic contents, 
only on the challengeable assumption that a 
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difference of informativeness involves (or reduces 
to) a difference of semantic contents.3 Another 
is to show that the phenomenon pointed out by 
Frege through his statement of the puzzle, viz. 
the obvious and uncontroversial fact that one 
can without irrationality refer to, or think of, 
the same object using different singular terms 
without knowing that one does, is puzzling only 
if the data on which its rests are coupled with 
an assumption that has arguably little to do with 
semantics, the assumption that one cannot refer 
to, or think of, the object unless one knows which 
object it is –in Wettstein’s terminology, unless 
one has a “cognitive fix” on it.4 Still another 
possibility is to show that on all (metaphysical, 
semantical, cognitive) versions of it, the puzzle 
arises only insofar as the empirical data –about 
identity and identity statements, the relationship 
between synonymy and sameness of cognitive 
value, that between sameness of information 
content and informativeness of objectual-identity 
judgments– involved in its formulation have 
been systematically skewed by prior epistemic 
concerns; so that once the disentangling is done 
there is no reason to feel any puzzled by so-called 
“Frege puzzles”.5
A recent further instance of this type of 
approach is Glezakos’s (2009). In this short yet 
significant paper, the author argues that the 
puzzle cannot be posed as it is by Frege (1892) 
either because it involves a petitio principii –it 
assumes that which it is meant to establish, 
namely the necessity of the distinction between 
Sinn and Bedeutung– or because, neutrally posed, 
it cannot be set up. Either way, it should not be 
considered, on Glezakos’s account, any puzzling 
either by the non-Fregeans (who take the notion 
of Sinn to be highly problematic and useless) or 
the Fregeans (who supposedly use the distinction 
as a general framework both to generate and solve 
the puzzle).
Although I agree with Glezakos (2009: 
202) that Frege’s statement of the puzzle is 
“problematic”, I do not think it is for the reasons 
she gives. So, after reviewing her argument and 
raising a few objections against it (section 1), I 
shall try to correctly pinpoint the source of the 
problem (section 2). As I see it, the problem stems 
from a couple of questionable assumptions made 
just as much by Frege in the original statement 
as by Glezakos on her account of why it is 
un-puzzling. So, if I am right, the point also holds 
against her.
1. Sameness of Name 
 
Glezakos’s Account
To make my point, I need to give a more 
detailed outline of Glezakos’s account. Drawing 
on Kaplan’s (1989: 598 n.70; 1990: 95) insightful 
suggestions, she assumes that the number of 
names, or perhaps more adequately, of singular 
terms contained in the identity sentences (whose 
forms are given, respectively, by the schemas a=a, 
or b=b, and a=b) matters to a neutral statement 
of the puzzle.6 It matters, on her view, in the 
following sense: if a neutral way of stating it is at 
all available – as seems reasonable to assume if 
Frege is to avoid the fallacy of taking for granted 
that which the necessity of is to be established, 
it must be one on which the individuation of 
the respective forms of the identity sentences is 
explained in terms of one name occurring twice 
in the a=a (or b=b) schema, on the one hand, and 
two names occurring once in the a=b schema, on 
the other hand.7 If this is how identity-sentence 
forms are (ultimately) individuated, Frege must 
have at his disposal, so goes the story, some 
independent criterion of name individuation – 
one independent, that is, of any appeal to the 
notion of Sinn.
It is at this point that Glezakos’s boldest yet 
questionable interpretive move comes in. Taking 
the notorious footnote B as evidence, she claims 
that Frege (1892), if not explicitly, is at least 
implicitly committed to a substantive and general 
view of sameness of name on which it is the 
same whenever the same relation holds between 
the sign and the referent. Thus, to take footnote 
B example, the ordinary proper name ‘Aristotle’ 
is, on the view she ascribes to Frege, the same on 
its twofold occurrence in “Aristotle=Aristotle” 
provided the (designating) relation between 
the sign and its referent (Bedeutung) remains 
unchanged. That this is Frege’s view is supposedly 
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evidenced by the fact that the variations in 
sense (Sinn) across speakers, of which Frege 
(1892, 28) says they “may be tolerated” outside 
“the theoretical structure of a demonstrative 
science”, stand out against the background of an 
unchanged relation of designation between the 
sign and its referent.
Be it as it may, it is this view, along with the 
required availability of an independent account of 
identity-sentence form individuation, which leads 
Glezakos to deliver her own diagnosis. As she sees 
it, the puzzle neutrally stated cannot be set up as 
no epistemic divide between sentences of the form 
a=a (or b=b) and a=b of the sort Frege takes to be 
a key element in the puzzle arises in the first place.
To see this, it is worth remembering that, 
on Frege’s (1892) classic statement of the puzzle, 
it is not the contrast alone between a trivial (or 
uninformative) truth and an informative one that 
generates the puzzle, but the contrast together 
with the assumption that identity statements 
of the form a=a and a=b mean the same – in 
metaphysically-laden terms, express the same 
relation of a thing to itself. So, if it ever turns out 
that no epistemic divide of the sort pointed out by 
Frege ensues from his (alleged) view about what 
makes a name the same, there will be no reason to 
feel any puzzled by this since there is, so it seems, 
nothing particularly puzzling about the fact that 
the same proposition (relation) can be expressed 
by sentences of the form a=a (or b=b) and a=b 
provided that ‘a’ and ‘b’ in “a=b” stand for the 
same object and ‘=’ for the same identity relation 
in “a=a” and “a=b”.8
That no “in-principle epistemic divide” 
(2009: 204) between sentences of the form a=a 
(or b=b) and a=b ensues from Frege’s (alleged) 
view is supposedly evidenced by the fact that a 
subject can without irrationality deny the truth 
of an identity sentence of the form a=a (or b=b) 
wherein the same name occurs twice, or get 
to learn by way of empirical investigation that 
the same sentence is true. If those possibilities 
are open –as it seems they are-, this means that 
the content of a statement of the form a=a (or 
b=b) can be just as informative and a posteriori 
justifiable as that of a statement of the form a=b 
and, accordingly, that no epistemic contrast can 
be drawn between the two identity-sentence 
forms. Frege’s puzzle, so it seems, cannot be 
posed because, neutrally stated, it cannot even get 
off the ground.
Rejoinder(s)
For one thing, it is doubtful Frege has ever 
put forth a general criterion of name individuation 
of the kind ascribed to him by Glezakos. The fact 
that, in the footnote B example, the sign/referent 
relation remains unchanged across the name’s 
occurrences is no evidence in favour of his having 
entertained a substantive and general conception of 
name individuation. It is, rather, something Frege 
assumes or postulates for the sake of the example 
in order to show that different speakers can attach 
different senses to the same ordinary proper name.
For another, the epistemic contrast Glezakos 
takes not to follow from Frege’s (alleged) view of 
name individuation is drawn by Frege on altogether 
different grounds, namely on logical rather than 
semantic grounds. As Frege understands it, the 
difference of epistemic profiles of sentences of 
the form a=a (or b=b) and a=b is owed to a 
difference pertaining to the respective grounds 
on which they are true and known to be true. 
Sentences of the form a=a are instances of the 
(self-) identity law, viz. x x=x, which is a logical 
truth. So, it is enough to know that x x=x is true 
to know that a=a is. By contrast, sentences of the 
form a=b are empirical (as opposed to logical) 
truths that require a special act of recognition on 
the part of the subject to be known as such.9 So, 
there surely is for Frege an intractable epistemic 
difference between sentences of the form a=a and 
a=b precisely because their respective epistemic 
profiles are not spelled out by Frege on the basis 
of a general criterion of name individuation plus 
an account of what it takes to know their truth, but 
on the basis of logical considerations. Claiming, 
as Glezakos does, that there is no “in-principle 
epistemic divide” on a neutral statement of the 
puzzle because in both cases some “ability to 
recognize that the referent is the same” (2009: 
205) is required simply misses the logical point.
Finally, her argument is conclusive only 
on the assumption that the number of names 
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contained in the identity sentences matters to a 
neutral statement of the puzzle. The assumption is 
questionable, for the Kripke-like cases sometimes 
appealed to to argue that an identity sentence 
containing two distinct occurrences of the same 
name may be informative and known a posteriori 
(viz. after empirical investigation) can be taken 
to show, instead, that no matter how many 
names occur in the sentence, its truth may be 
considered nontrivial and a posteriori knowable 
depending on whether the name is used in 
both of its occurrences to refer to the same 
object.10 On this view, it is not essential to a 
neutral statement of the puzzle (one that does not 
appeal to a difference of senses) that two names, 
instead of one, occur in the identity sentence 
for the sentence to contain [a] “very valuable 
extension(s) of our knowledge” (Frege 1892: 25) 
or for its truth to be known only after empirical 
investigation. Take a couple of true sentences of 
the form a=a (or b=b), say (i) “Paderewski is 
Paderewski” and (ii) “Paderewski is Paderewski”. 
Suppose that in (i) each occurrence of the name 
is used for a different object, say Paderewski-the-
politician and Paderewski-the-musician. Suppose 
that in (ii) both occurrences of the name are used 
for the same object, say Paderewski-the-musician 
(or Paderewski-the-politician). Intuitively, the two 
sentences have different cognitive values; the 
former being informative while the other is 
uninformative. It all turns, of course, on what 
the names are used for on their occurrences. 
Now take a couple of true sentences of the form 
a=b, say (iii) “this bachelor is this unmarried 
man” and (iv) “this bachelor is this unmarried 
man”.11 Intuitively, (iii) may be considered old 
hat by someone who takes the nominal phrases 
to be synonymous and (iv) can be considered 
informative if ‘this’ on each of its occurrences is 
used for a different part of the man’s body –while 
some parts are, say, hidden by a pillar.
The conclusion to draw from this is that 
Frege’s puzzle neither is circular, for it is 
originally stated on the basis of logical rather than 
semantic considerations, nor impossible to set up 
on a neutral statement of it, for the difference of 
epistemic profiles of the identity sentences need 
not be reflected at the syntactic level, as witnessed 
by my examples of true identity sentences of the 
same form having different cognitive values.
Now, my aim here is not to defend the integrity 
of the puzzle against circularity objections, nor to 
show that it can be set up no matter how many 
names occur in the identity sentences. It is, rather, 
to correctly pinpoint the source of the problem, as 
I think it has been mislocated by Glezakos on her 
explanation of why Frege’s puzzle is problematic.
2. Type-Token Ambiguity, Sentence 
Forms, and Cognitive Value(s)
It might be replied that on Frege’s original 
statement of the puzzle, the number of names 
occurring in the identity sentences does matter 
since analytic and a priori justified are, on Frege’s 
view, exclusively predicable of sentences of the 
form a=a while synthetic and not-always-a-priori 
justified are exclusively predicable of sentences 
of the form a=b. Moreover, no pragmatic theory 
of reference is available within Frege’s semantic 
framework, at least as far as proper names 
are concerned. An interesting question to ask, 
however, is the following: why are those options 
simply not open to him? Answering it, the idea is, 
may give us a clue as to where the source of the 
problem is to be located.
As I see it, the problem does not stem from the 
alleged circularity of the statement, nor from the 
impossibility, on a neutral statement, to generate 
the epistemic divide required to set up the puzzle, 
but from a couple of questionable assumptions 
made by Frege on its original formulation:
 (i) There is no ambiguity as to which aspect 
of the sign (in its relation to the referent) is to 
be considered relevant to a neutral statement 
of the puzzle.
 (ii) It is of the identity-sentence forms 
themselves one may sensibly say they are 
true, false, nontrivially or trivially true 
(informative or uninformative).
I shall consider in turn each assumption 
and show that Frege not only is committed to 
making them, but also leaves them unsupported 
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on his own statement of the puzzle; hence its 
“problematic” character.
That Frege is committed to (i) is evidenced 
by the following fact: one single name can be 
said to occur twice in sentences of the form 
a=a only on the assumption that the identity 
at stake here is type identity. And in sentences 
of the form a=b, two names can be said to 
occur once (each) only on the assumption that 
‘a’ and ‘b’ are tokens of distinct types.12 Now, 
as far as interpreted sentences are concerned, 
the assumption is clearly challengeable on the 
grounds that which aspects of the sign are to be 
considered relevant to judgments of sameness and 
distinctness (therefore, to the puzzle) is a matter 
of linguistic conventions. Suppose it is decided in 
some linguistic community that, when it comes 
to judging whether a linguistic item is the same, 
priority should be given to the unrepeatable 
physical (written or spoken) item rather than 
to that which is physically instantiated once or 
twice.13 An utterance of a sentence of the form 
a=a, or b=b (with assertoric force) may, then, 
be taken to express just as informative and a 
posteriori knowable a truth as an utterance of a 
sentence of the form a=b on the type-oriented 
approach. Conversely, an utterance of a sentence 
of the form a=b may be taken to express just 
as analytic and a priori knowable a truth as an 
utterance of a sentence of the form a=a (or b=b) 
on the type-oriented approach. So, it is a mistake 
or at least an oversimplification to claim that an 
epistemic contrast is or is not available simpliciter 
–no matter which aspects of the signs are deemed 
relevant to a neutral statement of the puzzle.
The evidence that Frege is committed to (ii) 
is quite straightforward since he claims (1892: 
25) that “a=a and a=b”, if true, “are obviously 
sentences (Sätze) of differing cognitive value 
[Erkenntniswert]” and that the former “holds a 
priori […] while sentences of the form a=b often 
contain very valuable extensions of our knowledge 
and cannot always been established a priori”. He 
thereby draws no clear distinction between true, 
false, informative and uninformative, thought of as 
properties of uninterpreted as opposed to interpreted 
sentences. The assumption is contentious as, in 
contemporary logic at least, sentence forms like 
a=a (or b=b) and a=b are neither true, nor false; 
let alone informatively or trivially so. They are, as 
Glezakos (2009: 203) herself points out, “schemas”, 
that is, representations of the composition of 
sentences arrived at by abstracting from actual 
names and verbs occurring in actual sentences.14 
As they are, they say nothing and, accordingly, 
are neither truth-evaluable nor worth of epistemic 
evaluation. It is not the forms themselves that can 
sensibly be said to be true or false, but instances 
of them taken from already interpreted natural 
languages such as “Paderewski is Paderewski”, 
“Scott is the author of Waverley”, “This bachelor is 
this unmarried man”, etc.15
Of course, this cannot be Frege’s view since 
he has a different conception both of logic and 
of its subject matter. On his view, it makes sense 
to speak of the truth of a=a and a=b only to the 
extent that they are taken in the first place to 
express truth-evaluable contents –“thoughts” in his 
terminology. To the extent that logic deals (or, at 
least, must deal) with contentful sentences, one is 
allowed to speak of informative or trivial sentences 
of such and such form. Frege, so it seems, can be 
rescued by arguing that, on his own conception 
of logic, there is no room for the contemporary 
distinction between uninterpreted (sentence) forms 
and interpreted ones and that, as a consequence, 
his view is immune to criticisms stemming from 
a contemporary “schematic” conception of logic.16
Still, there is a worry about why Frege 
says and whether he is ever allowed to say 
that some (in contrast to other) sentences are 
informative (or trivial) in virtue of having such 
and such form. Unless he provides us with a 
substantial story about how such forms are 
given (or whether they are at all), one cannot 
take (ii) to be backed by the sheer data –viz. by 
the obvious informativeness, as opposed to the 
non-informativeness, of some natural-language 
sentences in some of their uses.17
This suggests that the puzzle as stated in 
the opening paragraphs of Frege (1892) is indeed 
problematic, yet not for the reasons given by 
Glezakos (2009). For, she is no position to give 
her account unless she makes the same kind of 
questionable assumptions as Frege’s. A better option, 
so it seems, would be to question the purported 
capacity of Frege’s statement to accommodate 
the sheer data without distorting them by prior 
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epistemic concerns as to how sentence forms must 
be given if the corresponding contents are to count 
as trivial (as opposed to informative) and a priori 
(as opposed a posteriori) knowable.18 If nothing of 
the sort turns out to be possible, Frege’s puzzle is, 
so it seems, doomed to dissolve unless one has a 
better formulation to give.
Notes
1. Research for this paper has benefited from the 
financial support of the PUC-Rio (Bolsa de 
Incentivo à Produtividade em Ensino e Pesquisa 
2012-2014) and the CAPES/COFECUB (scheme 
number 690/10). I am grateful to these institutions.
2. This is not new. The trend goes back, as far as I 
can tell, to Wettstein’s (1986, 1988, 1989, 1991) 
and Salmon’s (1986) groundbreaking works. Late 
representatives include Wettstein (2004), Almog 
(2008), and Glezakos (2009).
3. The assumption can be challenged on the ground 
that the semantic content (viz. what is said) 
encoded by the two sentences when used to 
state something should not be conflated with 
the pragmatic information imparted on uttering 
them. See Salmon (1986, 77-79).
4. Wettstein (1988, 2004).
5. This is, in a nutshell, Almog’s (2008) strategy.
6. The paper focuses on ordinary proper names. 
However, Frege’s puzzle is originally intended 
to cover a full range of expressions ‘a’ and 
‘b’ stand for in the above-mentioned schemas: 
ordinary proper names, definite descriptions, and 
presumably demonstratives and indexicals as well. 
They all are Eigennamen in the generic, puzzle-
relevant sense of linguistic expressions standing 
for determinate objects. See Frege (1892, 27). Had 
Glezakos paid enough attention to other members 
of the category, notably simple demonstratives 
like ‘this’ accompanied by pointing gestures, 
she might have come to the opposite conclusion 
that the puzzle can be posed even though no 
difference appears at the syntactic level between 
the identity sentences. I owe this point to Marco 
Ruffino.
7. To be fair, the author does not claim that this is 
the only way to account for the individuation of 
identity-sentence forms. All she claims is that this 
account is “the most natural one” (Glezakos, 2009, 
203). However, the fact that no alternative account 
is considered in the paper limits considerably its 
scope and relevance.
8. On Frege’s statement of the puzzle the 
metaphysical and semantical issues are mixed 
up where they should be carefully distinguished. 
This may give us a further, yet different reason to 
be suspicious about his own statement. On this, 
see Almog (2008, 555-568).
9. “Even today the recognition (Wiedererkennung) 
of a small planet or a comet is not always a matter 
of course” (Frege, 1892, 25-26). See also Beaney 
(1997, 365).
10. By ‘Kripke-like cases’, I mean the sort of case in 
which it may be discovered (or wondered whether) 
the same object (person) was referred to by two 
occurrences of a name, say ‘Paderewski (the 
musician)’ and ‘Paderewski (the politician)’, as it 
is happens with Pierre in Kripke’s (1979) story. 
These are run-of-the-mill cases often experienced 
in real-life situations.
11.	 I	 borrow	 this	 example	 from	Corazza	 and	Dokič	
(1995: 164 fn4).
12. Here I need not get into the debate as to whether 
there are types and, if so, what they are. I assume 
there are and that an important feature of them is 
their having tokens (thought of as unrepeatable 
physical items). Like Wetzel (2009), I find it 
convenient to think of types as abstract objects in 
the broad, Fregean sense of ‘object’.
13. As Searle (1958, 167) rightly points out, “some 
codes are like this”.
14. Note that the equal sign (‘=’) sometimes used 
in (some) natural languages to express identities 
–this paper is no exception!- is not, strictly 
speaking, part of them. So, there is a substantial 
issue as to how identities like “Paderewski is 
Paderewski” or “Scott is the author of Waverley” 
are to be translated into a logical language. 
E. g. it is not at all mandatory to translate an 
identity sentence such as the latter into a schema 
containing the equal sign, as shown convincingly 
by Russell (1905). On this, see Almog (2008, 
553-554).
15. Almog (2008, 554-555) made the point.
16. In On the Foundations of Geometry, Frege 
(McGuinness (Ed.), 1984, 315) makes the 
following statement: “The word ‘interpretation’ 
is objectionable, for when properly expressed, 
a thought leaves no room for different 
interpretations. We have seen that ambiguity 
[Vieldeutigkeit] must be rejected […].” 
On the differences between Frege’s and the 
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contemporary “schematic” conception of logic, 
see Goldfarb (2001).
17. An obvious objection is that Frege is not 
interested, in the original formulation, in setting 
up a puzzle for natural-language semantics, but 
only for an ideal language –one designed for 
the expression and communication of scientific 
truths, discoveries, and demonstrations. I agree 
with that. But if the semantic structures picked 
out to this (primarily epistemological) end are 
ever applicable, the capacity of Frege’s statement 
to accommodate the data from natural language 
is back on the agenda. Thanks to David Chalmers 
and Dirk Greimann for the objection.
18. Almog (2008) takes this line.
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